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PENNSYLVANIA CRIME COMMISSION
...

HEROES OR HEAVIES?

I. I roDUCTINo
Pennsylvania's organized crime is a conglomerate arrangement of criminal organizations. It is not a monolithic syndicate and is not dominated by a single individual. It is
an alliance composed of powerful La Cosa Nostra families
and local crime czars. ....
Like the Cosa Nostra families,
the local syndicates have significant wealth, influence, and
power, and regional and national connections. The central,
undeniable finding is that there are permanent, ongoing
criminal conspiracies operating in Pennsylvania which are
controlled in large part, but not exclusively, by La Cosa
Nostra families. 1
Recognizing that organized crime represents a formidable force
operating within our society, the Pennsylvania legislature created
the Pennsylvania Crime Commission in 1968.2

The Pennsylvania

legislature thus became one of the first state legislatures to create
a permanent agency with the ability to conduct a systematic and
continuing investigation into the caverns of organized crime. The
purpose of this Comment shall be to examine that agency in terms
of what it is and how it operates, and to consider some of the legal
issues presented by its operation.
II. THE CRIME COIMISSION

The year 1967 saw the publication of two reports by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice. s These comprehensive studies of federal and state criminal
justice systems cited the important role which could be played by
crime investigating commissions as one of a series of strategies to
be used against organized crime.
This recommendation from the President's Commission combined with the availability of federal funds from the Law Enforcement Assistance Agency led the Pennsylvania Legislature to create
in 1968 the Pennsylvania Crime Commission. 4 The Legislature es1. Pennsylvania Crime Commission, Report on Organized Crime,
at 1 (1970).
2. PA. STAT. AwN. tit. 71, §§ 62, 179, 307-7 (Supp. 1972).
3. President's Commission of Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society (1967); Task
Force Report: Organized Crime (1967).
4.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 62, 179, 307-7 (Supp. 1972).

tablished the Crime Commission as an administrative commission
within the Department of Justice.6 The membership of the Commission consists of four commissioners appointed by the Governor,
and the Attorney General who serves as chairman.6 The present
members of the Crime Commission are Attorney General Israel
Packel, Chairman; Honorable Richardson Dilworth; Dean Ronald
R. Davenport; George J. Barco; and Russel J. O'Malley.
With its central office in St. Davids, Pennsylvania, the Com7
mission presently operates with a staff of forty-nine members.
The Act creating the Crime Commission provides that the chairman of the Commission appoint and fix the compensation for these
employees.8 The forty-nine member staff presently includes one
executive director; one director of intelligence; two organized
crime analysts; six attorneys; twenty-two special agents, of which
fifteen are investigators and seven are accountants; and seventeen
clerical personnel. Except for the attorneys, who are Deputy Attorneys General in the Department of Justice, and the executive
director, the staff falls within the purview of the Civil Service
Act. 9
The Crime Commission presently has plans to increase its staff
by a total of twenty-three positions. 10 These new positions would
include the following: one administrative officer; one director of
field operations; one additional organized crime analyst; an economist and a market researcher, who would study the economic impact of organized crime; eleven additional special agents; and
seven additional clerical personnel.
The Act of 1968 defined the powers and duties of the Crime
Commission as follows:
(1) To inquire into the causes of crime and delinquency,
measures for their prevention, the adequacy of law enforcement and the administration of justice.
(2) To develop standards and make recommendations for
actions which may be taken by the State and local governments to prevent, reduce and control crime and increase
respect for law, including, but not limited to improvements
in training of law enforcement personnel, improvements
in techniques, organization and administration of law enforcement activities, improvements in the administration
of justice, and rehabilitation techniques.
(3) To investigate all crime generally, and shall have the
power to investigate but not limited to any relationship between any combination of persons involved in the commission of crimes on one hand, and any government or political
5. Id. at § 62.
6. Id. at § 179(a).
7. Interview with Owen M. Morris, Executive Director, Pennsylvania Crime Commission, September 20, 1972.
8. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 179(d) (Supp. 1972).
9. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 741.1-744.1055 (1962).

10. Owen Morris, interview.
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unit, or any association, organization, trade or business constituting a part or, doing business within the Commonwealth, and to gather evidence of the existence of organized or syndicate crime in the Commonwealth.
(4) To investigate all fields of organized or syndicate
crime.
(5) To carry out continued research and planning to improve the quality of criminal justice.
(6) To make a detailed written report of every completed
investigation which may include recommendation for legislative or administrative action.
(9) To require the attendance and testimony of witnesses
and the production of documentary evidence relative to
any investigation which the commission may conduct in accordance with the powers given it . . [t]he commission
may invoke the aid of any court ... (to enforce the subpoena).
(10) To compile and publish rules for the calling of meetings and to carry out the provisions of this act.1
Section 10 of the Act grants to the Commission the power to
compile and publish rules to carry out the provisions of the Act.
The rules under which the Commission is presently operating were
adopted on November 30, 1971.12 The rules permit a meeting to be
called by the chairman or by three commissioners; a quorum is
three Commission members. Attendance at the meetings is limited
to Commission members and "such other persons as the Commission shall designate." The rules provide that special agents shall
have the authority to conduct interviews, receive testimony and
documents and "otherwise obtain evidence and gather information
by any lawful means.""3 Subpoenas ad testificandum require testimony to be given at a Commission hearing, while Subpoenas duces
tecum may require records produced at a hearing or merely made
available for inspection by Commission staff members at the election of the chairman. 14 The rules provide that a hearing may be
conducted by any member of the Commission or by any member of
the Commission staff; and these hearings may be open or closed
15
to the public, as the Commission may direct.
At the hearing itself the Commission is not bound by the
traditional rules of evidence, 1 and the presiding officer may re11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

PA. STAT. ANN.tit. 71, § 307-7 (Supp. 1972).
1 Pa. Bull. 2231.
Id. at § 2.2(a).
Id. at § 2.3(a).
Id. at § 2.9(a).
Id. at § 2.7(a).

ceive any evidence which he deems relevant to the investigation. 17
Witnesses may place in the record or read a prepared statement if
the presiding officer approves the statement. Such approval must
ordinarily be obtained twenty-four hours in advance."' Witnesses
are permitted to be accompanied and advised by counsel; but the
counsel may not, of right, otherwise participate in the hearing. 19
Witnesses may object to questions; however, the ruling thereon by
the presiding officer is final. 20 A witness may also make an oral
or written closing statement subject to the Commission's interruption or deletion of any "impertinent, scandalous, or otherwise improper" material.

21

Any person who is individually identified, expressly or by
clear implication, in a public hearing or report of the Commission
has the right to appear at a public hearing and testify on his own
22
behalf as to matters relevant to such evidence.
III.

LEGAL ISSUES PRESENTED BY THE OPERATION

OF THE CRIME COMMISSION

The manner in which the Pennsylvania Crime Commission is
authorized to and does operate, appears to create in the Commission a concurrence of two factors, power and autonomy. This concurrence and the manner in which it is used raise questions of the
constitutionality of the Crime Commission itself, the constitutionality of the investigatory power granted to the Commission, and
the constitutionality of the manner in which the Crime Commission
exercises those investigatory powers.
A.

Constitutionality
The Proprietyof Delegation of Powers
The principle of non-delegation of legislative power is a con-

cept deeply rooted in constitutional law. 23

The branches of gov-

ernment are all of limited and defined powers, 24 to be kept separate in all cases where they were not expressly blended. 25 Thus a
legislature can delegate neither its function 26 nor its power 27 to
make a law. In the Crime Commission Act the Pennsylvania Leg17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
(1874).
25.
26.
494, 158
27.

Id.
Id.
Id. at § 2.8 (b).
Id. at § 2.8(c).
Id. at § 2.8(d).
Id. at § 2.10(a).
E.g., Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1 (1825).
E.g., Citizen's Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655, 663
See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
In re Baldwin Tp. v. Allegheny County, Annexation, 305 Pa. 490,
A. 272, 273 (1931).
Appeal of Weinstein, 159 Pa. Super. 437, 439, 48 A.2d 1, 3 (1946).
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islature created in the Crime Commission the power to decide the
manner in which the Commission would carry out the provisions of
the Act. 28 The question thus presented is whether the Legislature, by permitting the Commission to establish its own rules and
to determine for itself the standards under which it would operate,
delegated its legislative power in violation of the non-delegation
principle. If one seeks to find his answer in history he finds
ample precedent for what the Pennsylvania Legislature has done.
The creation of crime commissions is a recent development; but
the creation of other commissions, committees or governmental
bodies with investigative power is not.29 Indeed, the creation of
such bodies is "as old as the Republic. 3 0 It may be that the creation of such administrative bodies can be justified under the nondelegation principle in that there is not a delegation of the power
to make a law but only a delegation of the power to determine
some fact or state of affairs upon which the Legislature intends to
make its own actions depend. 31 But the better explanation would
appear to be twofold. First, the creation of such commissions or
bodies can be justified in that the Legislature prescribes adequate
standards by which the body is to operate3 2 thereby having delegated only the details of administration.33 Second, the creation of
such bodies can be justified under the sphere of public policy in
that such bodies are requisite to the efficient functioning of government in a complex modern society.3 4 As the society for which
government must make laws has become more complex the need
for facts and more facts has increased in geometric proportions
and the need for administrative agencies has become pressing.
Investigations are useful ...

for determining general pol-

icy, for recommending legislation, and for purposes no
more specific than illuminating obscure areas to find out
what if anything should be done.3 5
28. PA. STAT. ANN.tit. 71, § 923(10) (Supp. 1972).
29. See Annenberg v. Roberts, 333 Pa. 203, 2 A.2d 612 (1938) (noting
the history of such bodies in Pennsylvania).
30. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 444 (1960) (referring to legislative committees formally established within the legislative branch of
government).
31. See Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Chester School
Dist., 427 Pa. 157, 233 A.2d 290 (1967); Commonwealth v. Collins, 203 Pa.
Super. 125, 199 A.2d 470 (1964).
32. See notes 39-44 and accompanying text infra.
33. Commonwealth Dept. of Revenue v. Creps, 200 Pa. Super. 17, 22,
186 A.2d 670, 672 (1962) (holding that the delegation merely of the details of administration does not violate the non-delegation principle).
34. See K. Davis, AnMNIsTRATIVE LAw TEXT 53-5 (3d ed. 1971).
35. 1 K. Davis, ADMINISTRATivE LAW TREATISE 160 (1958).

Regardless of the theory by which one chooses to explain the
creation of the administrative agency, it is evident that the nondelegation principle has been substantially or even completely
eroded. Delegation has become necessary in order that the exertion of legislative power does not become a futility. 6 The creation
of commissions to investigate subjects upon which legislation may
properly be based has been sustained in Pennsylvania, 37 and commissions similar to the Pennsylvania Crime Commission are in operation in New York, New Jersey, and Illinois.38
Delegation Under a PrescribedStandard
As it became recognized that the delegation of legislative powers to administrative agencies would be required, it was also recognized that such a delegation should be made only when accompanied by a prescribed standard for its use.39 The Pennsylvania
courts have required that when power is delegated, "the legislative
body must surround such power with definite standards, policies,
and limitations,"40 and that there must be "adequate standards
which will guide and restrain the exercise of delegated administrative functions to withstand the attack based on alleged delegation
41
of powers."
No precise formula has been found which will assure the constitutionality of an administrative agency, but "reasonable clarity ' 4 2 or "reasonableness" 43 have been found to be constitutionally
valid standards. If no standard is prescribed the attempt to create
44
the administrative body is a nullity.
The statute creating the Crime Commission was accompanied
by no standard for the use of the powers of investigation. The
Commission at its own discretion determines what it will investigate and the manner in which that investigation shall be conducted. It is the present policy of the Commission to commence
36. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 398 (1940).
37. Annenberg v. Roberts, 333 Pa. 203, 210-11, 2 A.2d 612, 616-17
(1938).
38. New York Comm'n of Investigation, N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS, §§
7501-7507 (McKinney 1965); New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 9M (1970); Illinois Crime Investigating
Comm'n, ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38, § 203 (1954).
39. See, e.g, United States v. Shreveport Grain and Elevator Co.,
287 U.S. 77, 85 (1932); United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R. Co., 282
U.S. 311, 324 (1931).
40. Bell Tel. Co. v. Driscoll, 343 Pa. 109, 116, 21 A.2d 912, 915 (1941).
41. Chartiers Val. Joint Schools v. County Bd. of School Directors
of Allegheny County, 418 Pa. 520, 538, 211 A.2d 487, 493 (1965).
42. United States v. Dettra Flag Co., 86 F. Supp. 84, 96 (E.D. Pa.
1949).
43. United States ex rel. Czapkowski v. Holland, 220 F.2d 436, 437
(3d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 826 (1955).
44. United States v. Dettra Flag Co., 86 F. Supp. 84 (E.D. Pa. 1949);
Bell Tel. Co. v. Driscoll, 343 Pa. 109, 21 A.2d 912 (1941).
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45
an investigation with the adoption of a formal resolution, al46
In all nine investigations 47
though this is only a recent policy.
which the Crime Commission has begun since its formation, the
Commissioners have voted unanimously to commence the investigation. 48 Suggestions as to what should be investigated have
come from district attorneys, local government officials, local police
departments, informers, and "other investigative and intelligence
sources."4 5 But the Attorney General has stated that no requests
for investigations have ever come from the Governor, the State
50
Police, or from any county commissioners.
Since the Crime Commission Act did not specify in particulars
the guidelines under which the Commission is to operate and the
Commission has itself defined its mandate in the broadest of
terms,5 ' the question arises whether the creation of the Crime
Commission without the application of a prescribed standard by
which the Commission is to use its powers renders the Commission
unconstitutional under Pennsylvania law. The Commonwealth
court recently answered this question negatively, declaring that
"so long as one may garner from the statute its legislative purpose,
and that purpose is within the constitutional power of the Legislature, the investigative agency may set its own reasonable guidelines to carry out the legislative purpose."5 2 This decision would
seem to be in accord with a recognizable trend of federal cases
which liberalize the requirement that a standard accompany a
delegation of power.53
In conclusion, the Pennsylvania law today upholds the constitutionality of the Legislature's delegation of its fact finding powers
and upholds that delegation as manifested in the Crime Commission
Act. The questions remain unanswered, however, whether the

45. Interview with former Attorney General J. Shane Creamer,
Chairman, Pa. Crime Comm'n, September 22, 1972.
46. See In re: The Petition of the Pa. Crime Comm'n for an Order to Com. Development Ass'n of Pa., Inc. to Produce Documentary Evidence, No. 905 C.D. (Pa. Commonwealth Ct. March 17, 1972).
47. Owen Morris, interview.
48. Creamer, interview.
49. Id.
50.

Id.

51. "It's [Crime Commission's] legislative mandate is to investigate
all crime generally and organized crime in particular." Pa. Crime
Comm'n, Report on Organized Crime at 81, July 2, 1970.
52. Pennsylvania Crime Comm'n v. Nacrelli, 5 Pa. Commonwealth
Ct. 551, 564 (1972).
53. See, e.g., Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947) (approving "no
standard"); Tagg Bros. and Moorehead v. United States, 280 U.S. 420
(1930) (accepting "just and reasonable" standard).

guidelines which the Commission has set are "reasonable" 5 4 and
whether the Commission in its investigative capacity has exceeded
the authority which was delegated.
B. The Administrative Subpoena
Based upon its intention to create an administrative agency
which could be fully effective in its investigation of organized
crime, the Pennsylvania Legislature granted to the Crime Commission the power of the administrative subpoena. 55 This grant empowers the Crime Commission to require the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of documentary evidence
relative to any investigation which the Commission may conduct. 6
Section 520 of the Administrative Code specifically gives to every
administrative department, which includes the Department of Justice, "the power to issue subpoenas, requiring the attendance of
witnesses. .... ,,57
The Subpoena and the Changing FederalRule
It was the early impression of the United States Supreme
Court that the use of the administrative subpoena was contrary to
the fourth amendment-' and contrary to the "first principles of
justice."'59 Indeed it was Justice Holmes speaking for a unanimous
court when he decried the practice of conducting "fishing expeditions into private papers on the possibility that they may disclose
evidence of crime."6 Since an overriding function of the fourth
amendment is the protection of personal privacy 6 ' against unwarranted intrusion by the state,6 2 this early federal rule appeared to
be strongly based upon constitutional principles.
In the 1940's, however, there was a re-assessment of the needs
for and of administrative agencies, and of the agencies' requirements for facts and information. The years since 1940 have seen a
continued change in the law to reflect those needs. Oklahoma
Press Publishing Co. v. Walling,63 decided in 1946, is a landmark
case establishing the validity of the administrative subpoena. The
54. Pennsylvania Crime Comm'n v. Nacrelli, 5 Pa. Commonwealth

Ct. 551, 564 (1972).

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 923(9) (Supp. 1971).
56. Id.
57. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 200 (1964); see, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Orsini, 368 Pa. 259, 263, 81 A.2d 891, 893 (1951).
58. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (extending the protection of fourth amendment to any forcible and compulsory extortion
of a man's own testimony or of his private papers).
59. F.T.C. v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 305-06 (1924).
60. Id. at 306.
61. E.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
62. E.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).
63. 327 U.S. 186 (1946).

55.
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Court there bounded judicial enforcement of the administrative
subpoena by a test of three elements, all of which must be met for
the subpoena to be enforceable. The Court directed the judiciary
to examine a subpoena to determine:
(1) whether the inquiry is one the demanding agency is
authorized by law to make,
(2) whether the materials specified are relevant to the
authorized inquiry, and
(3) whether the disclosure sought is reasonable. 64
The Court, which was considering the enforcement of a subpoena
duces tecum demanding the production of corporate records and
papers, found that the fifth amendment afforded no protection by
virtue of the self-incrimination provision,65 and that the fourth
amendment would only guard against abuse through excessive indefiniteness or breadth in the things required to be described. 66
In sustaining the subpoena the Court found the gist of judicial protection to be "that the disclosure sought shall not be unreasonable," 7 and that the agency shall not act "arbitrarily and in excess
6' 8
of [its] statutory authority."
Whereas the Oklahoma case provided the fulcrum upon
which the law regarding the administrative subpoena began to
turn, the law fully changed in 1950 with the decision in United
States v. Morton Salt.6 9 The Court in Morton fully illuminated the
extent and scope of the administrative subpoena. Recognizing
that the power involved was the power to obtain needed information from those reluctant to give it, the Court stated that the power
of inquiry was not derived from the judicial function, and that the
judicial requirement that evidence would not be summoned until
shown to be relevant to issues in litigation did not apply to an administrative agency. 70 Holding that an agency would be permitted
to gain evidence merely on the suspicion that the law is being violated, 71 or to inform itself as to probable violations of the law, the
Court stated that
[e]ven if one were to regard the request for information
in this case as caused by nothing more than official curiosity, nevertheless law enforcing agencies have a legiti64. See Oklahoma Press v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
65. See, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) (that a corporation
has no privilege against self incrimination).
66. Oklahoma Press v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208 (1946).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 216.
69. 328 U.S. 632 (1950).
70. Id. at 650-51.
71. Id. at 651.

mate right to satisfy themselves that corporate72 behavior is
consistent with the law and the public interest.
It is thus evident that the present federal rule embodies in the
administrative agency a latitude of investigation bounded only by
that body's statutory authority and a discretion in the use of that
investigative power bounded only by relevancy and reasonable73
ness.
The Administrative Subpoena and PennsylvaniaLaw
There is very little case law in Pennsylvania deciding specifically the role of the judiciary in the enforcement of administrative
subpoenas. It is reasonably clear, though, that Pennsylvania law
was at one time in accord with prior federal law.74 But this law
was formulated in 1938, before the sweeping changes in the federal
rule7 5 and it is doubtful whether this decision retains its prior authority. Later cases have stated that the power to subpoena can
be granted to non-judicial bodies by statute, but have required the
extent of the power to be determined by express statutory grant.7 6
Neither of these cases examined the judicial review of the subpoena, but concerned themselves only with whether a specific
agency had or had not been granted the authority to issue subpoenas.17
The only reported Pennsylvania case which deals directly with
judicial enforcement of the subpoena ad testificandum issued by an
administrative agency is Pennsylvania Crime Commission v. Nacrelli78 decided in May of 1972. The court, quoting at length from
the Morton Salt decision,79 apparently followed the federal rule established by Morton. The Nacrefli decision in the commonwealth
court, however, has extended the federal rule so that in Pennsylvania there is an even more liberal rule now applicable to judicial
enforcement of administrative subpoenas. Nacrelli placed the burden of proof upon the respondent 0 to show that the information
sought by the Crime Commission was "clearly incompetent, irrele72. Id. at 652.
73. See Adams v. F.T.C., 296 F.2d 861 (8th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 864 (1962). Adams is a comprehensive opinion defining what
is relevant and not too broad. The court examines fourteen separate
items and cites much supporting authority. See United States v.
Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 385 F.2d 129 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 921 (1968).
74. See Annenberg v. Roberts, 333 Pa. 203, 2 A.2d 212 (1938).
75. See notes 58-73 and accompanying text supra.
76. Commonwealth v. Orsini, 368 Pa. 259, 81 A.2d 891 (1951); Commonwealth v. Delaware Val. Mut. Cas. Co., 89 Dauph. 42 (Pa. C.P. 1968).
77. See also, Matson v.. Jackson, 368 Pa. 283, 83 A.2d 134 (1951);
cf., Alpha Club v. Pa. Liquor Control Bd., 363 Pa. 53, 68 A.2d 730
(1949).

78. 5 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 551 (1972).
79.
80.

Id. at 575.
Id. at 577.
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vant, or immaterial to any lawful purpose under the statute." 81
The court added that judicial enforcement proceedings provide a
person to whom a subpoena is directed with a full opportunity to
test its validity and that such a person is entitled to have a court
determine if there are any reasons why a subpoena should not be
enforced. Stating that the court may consider such questions as,
"the authority to conduct an investigation, the power to issue the
subpoena, and any constitutional rights and privileges of the witness which he proves will be violated by his appearance at the
hearing,"8 2 the court concluded that the decision of whether to enforce a subpoena rests in the judicial discretion of the court. Thus
it is presently the law in Pennsylvania that an administrative subpoena will be refused enforcement only where the respondent overcomes the burden of proof by showing that the issuing agency is
exceeding its authority by its request for that particular testimony
or information. 3
The Motion to Quash and the Enforcement Proceeding
The individual who has been summoned by the Crime Commission to testify or to produce documentary evidence and who wishes
to challenge the subpoena may do so in two ways. He may either
file a motion to quash the subpoena or he may refuse to appear
when required and enter his defense when the Crime Commission
seeks court enforcement of its subpoena. These procedures, however, represent a most ineffective method for protecting an individual's rights. The commonwealth court has left the initial determination of whether a particular subject falls within the jurisdiction of the Commission to the Commission itself.8 4 It would
seem that a pleading by the Commission alleging reason to believe
81.
82.

Id.
Id.

83.

Illinois Crime Investigation Comm'n v. Buccieri 36 Ill. 2d 566,

224 N.E.2d 236, 240 (1967).
The contention of appellants requires consideration of a question, new to this court, of the proper scope of judicial review of
administrative subpoenaes. This issue has frequently been before
the Federal Courts, and it is now there established that judicial
review is limited to a consideration of the constitutionality of the
statute, whether the contemplated agency proceedings are included
within the statutory authority, the reasonableness of the demand
and the relevance of the information sought. (citations omitted).
Courts cannot consider whether an agency has probable cause for
its proposed action, defense on the merits of the administrative
proceeding, or procedural irregularities. (citations). Outside the
Federal system all the cases which we have found are consistent
with the Federal view. (citations).
84. Pennsylvania Crime Comm'n v. Nacrelli, 5 Pa. Commonwealth
Ct. 551, 577 (1972).

that an individual's testimony and the subject matter to be considered are relevant and within the purview of the Commission's
authority would be sufficient for the entry of an order enforcing
85
the subpoena.
The Crime Commission along with most other administrative
agencies is denied the power to compel compliance with its own
subpoenas with the apparent intent to interpose a neutral judicial
officer between the agency and the individual.8 6 The Nacrefli decision, however, has all but nullified this protection. Nacrelli effectively creates a judicial presumption that the Commission's
stated findings of relevancy are correct, 87 yet it failed to consider
the practical effect of that presumption. In the same opinion the
commonwealth court concluded that the subpoena issued by the
Crime Commission was enforceable even though the subpoena contained no notice of the subject matter of the investigation. 8 Thus
the individual to whom the subpoena is directed may have an
awareness that his testimony or records are required and nothing
more. He may have no notice of the subject matter of the investigation or of the reasons why his testimony or records are sought.
Yet upon the mere assertion by the Crime Commission that such
material is relevant and that the investigation is within the purview of the Commission's statutory grant of authority, the individual will have to overcome a burden of proof by showing that the
information sought is clearly incompetent, irrelevant or immaterial to an investigation about which he knows absolutely nothing.
In effect, the Commission itself has become under Nacrelli, the final judge of relevancy and the court has become an agency which
summarily approves the subpoena. 89
C. Due Process and the Administrative Hearing
As an historical concept due process has proved difficult of
definition,9" yet most will agree that it is one of man's most precious rights9 ' being the very essence of a scheme of ordered justice.92 Due process is denied by the failure to observe fundamental
fairness 93 since the protection of due process extends to rights in
85. Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 507-09 (1943).
86. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 307-7(9) (Supp. 1972).
87. See Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501 (1943).
88. Pennsylvania Crime Comm'n v. Nacrelli, 5 Pa. Commonwealth
Ct. 551, 574 (1972); see Kilgore Nat'l Bank v. Fed. Petroleum Bd., 209 F.2d
557, 560 (Oth Cir. 1954), accord, United States v. Woerth, 130 F. Supp.
930, 942 (N.D. Iowa 1955), aff'd, 231 F.2d 822 (8th Cir. 1956).
89. Although the commonwealth court decisions regarding subpoena
enforcement are mostly unreported, neither the Attorney General nor the
Executive Director of the Crime Commission can recall that a subpoena
of the Crime Commission has ever been quashed.
90. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
91. Ulman v. Baltimore, 72 Md. 587, 589, 20 A. 141, 142 (1890).
92. Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424 (1953).
93. E.g., Kinsella v. United States, 361 U.S. 234 (1960).
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the broadest sense of the term.9 4 Daniel Webster said that by due
process is meant "a law which hears before it condemns, which
proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial. 951
Procedural due process includes the guarantee that one of
whom it is sought to deprive of a right to life, liberty, or property
must be given notice of this fact, 96 that he must be allowed to defend himself,97 and that he must be allowed to meet a claim against
him on the law and on the facts.98 Due process specifically includes the fundamental rights of confrontation and cross-examination99 in all judicial proceedings.
The law concerning the application of due process rights to administrative hearings is set forth in two major United States Supreme Court decisions, Hannah v. Larche'01 and Jenkins v. MeKeithen.1' 0 Hannah holds the guarantees inapplicable where the
function of the administrative agency is purely investigatory,
whereas Jenkins holds the guarantees mandatory where the
agency exercises an accusatory function. An examination of each
of these decisions is necessary in order that one may determine
whether due process rights are mandatory at hearings of the Crime
10 2
Commission.
The HannahRule
During 1958 and 1959 the newly formed Commission on Civil
Rights 10 3 received some sixty-seven complaints from individual
black citizens of Louisiana who alleged that they had been discriminatorily deprived of their right to vote by the actions of
Louisiana registrars of voters.104 Based upon these complaints,
94. Ekern v. McGovern, 154 Wis. 157, 142 N.W. 595, 619 (1913).
95. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
96. E.g., Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233 (1944).
97. E.g., Iron Cliffs Co. v. Negaunee Iron Co., 197 U.S. 463, 469 (1905).
98. See, e.g., Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362 (1930).
99. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960); Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395
U.S. 411 (1969).
100. 363 U.S.420 (1960).
101. 395 U.S. 411 (1969).
102. Itshould be noted at this point that the Court in Jenkins
found itself not to be confronted with the question of determining
exactly which due process protections need be afforded at an administrative hearing at which actual findings are made that a
specific individual has violated criminal laws. The Court held that
due process requires the (labor) Commission to afford a person
being investigated the right to confront and cross-examine the
witnesses against him, those rights being fundamental aspects of
procedural due process.
395 U.S. at 429.
103. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1975-75e (1970) (established in 1957).
104. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 422 (1960).

and pursuant to its statutory authority to "investigate allegations
in writing and under oath or affirmation that certain citizens of the
United States are being deprived of their right to vote and have
that vote counted by reason of their color, race, religion, or national origin,"' 10 5 the Commission made several attempts to acquire
information ex parte which were unsuccessful. 10 6 The Commission then decided to hold a hearing for which it caused to be served
subpoenas duces tecum and ad testificandum upon Louisiana registrars of voters and upon private citizens.
The respondents filed suit to enjoin the Commission from
holding the hearing contending that they would suffer irreparable
harm by virtue of the Commission's refusal to furnish the names of
those persons alleging the deprivations, by the refusal to disclose
the contents of those allegations, and by the refusal to permit the
respondents to confront and cross-examine the persons making the
allegations. The district court rendered judgment granting the injunction' 07 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 10 8 The Supreme Court was thus squarely faced with the issue of whether the
procedures of the Civil Rights Commission violated the constitutional rights of due process of law. Finding that due process requirements frequently vary with the type of proceeding involved, 1 9 the Court found it necessary to examine the nature and
function of the Commission.
The duties of the Civil Rights Commission were to (1) investigate written, sworn allegations that anyone has been discriminatorily deprived of his right to vote; (2) study and collect information "concerning legal developments constituting the denial of
equal protection of the law under the Constitution;" and (3) report
to the President and Congress on its activities, findings, and recommendations. 110 The Court held:
[The function of the Commission] is purely investigative
and fact finding. It does not adjudicate. It does not hold
trials or determine anyone's civil or criminal liability. It
does not issue orders. Nor does it indict, punish or impose
any legal sanctions. It does not make determinations depriving anyone of his life, liberty or property. In short,
the Commission does not and cannot take any affirmative
action which will affect an individual's legal rights."'
Thus presented with the question of whether persons appearing before an administrative commission which exercises purely
105. 42 U.S.C. § 1975c (a)(1)(1970).
106. See Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 425 (1960).
107. Larche v.Hannah, 176 F. Supp.791 (W.D.La. 1959).
108. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970).
109. Compare Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v.Adm'r, 312 U.S. 126 (1941) with
Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 227 U.S. 88 (1913).
110. The full text of the duties of the Civil Rights Commission is
set forth at 42 U.S.C. § 1975c (1970).
111. Hannah v.Larche, 363 U.S.420, 451 (1960).
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investigative functions are entitled to the protections afforded by
the due process clause, the Court concluded that they were not.
When governmental agencies adjudicate or make binding
determinations which directly affect the legal rights of individuals, it is imperative that those agencies use procedures which have traditionally been associated with the
judicial process. On the other hand, when governmental
action does not partake of an adjudication, as for example,
when a general fact finding investigation is being conducted, it is not necessary
that the full panoply of judicial
112
procedures be used.
In formulating the Hannah rule, the Court drew clear distinctions between those commissions whose function is purely investigatory and those whose functions are adjudicatory or accusatory.
It is important to note in this respect, that the Court placed considerable emphasis on the legislative history of the Civil Rights
Act of 1957.113 The Act began as House Civil Rights Bill 627 in
1956.114 The Bill was reported out of the House Judiciary Commit-

tee without reference to the procedures to be used by the Commission in the conduct of its hearings. During the floor debate
amendments were offered which would have guaranteed a witness
the right to be fully advised as to the matters into which the Commission proposed to inquire and of the adverse material which
was to be presented; the right to appear and testify on his own behalf, and to re-call adverse witnesses so that he or his counsel
could cross-examine those witnesses. 115 The Bill as passed by the
House in 195" cuntaned all of these amendments; however, the
Bill did not pass the Senate. In the 1957 Session, Senate Bill 83,
which contained all of the procedural guarantees and protections
that the 1956 House Bill'" did, was rejected in favor of a new
House Bill with none of the protections. The new House Bill was
finally adopted as the Civil Rights Act of 1957.1 17 Thus the Court
in Hannah could rely upon a "conscious, intentional selection of
one bill, providing for none of the procedures demanded by Respondents, over another bill, which provided for all of those procedures."""
The Court also found it "highly significant" that the proce112. Id. at 442.
113.
114.
2d Sess.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id at 434.
See 102 Coxr. REc. 13542 (1956), H.R. REP. No. 2187, 84th Cong.,
(1956).
102 CONG. REc. 13542-43 (1956).
H.R. 627, See 102 CONG. REc. 13542 (1956).
103 CONG. REc. 8491 (1957).
Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 439 (1960).

dures of the Civil Rights Commission were not historically foreign
to other forms of investigation. 1 9 The Court noted that in the
power of investigation held by federal agencies such as the Atomic
Energy Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the
Federal Trade Commission, and the Securities and Exchange Commission, there were no rights of notice or cross-examination
120
granted.
It should further be noted that in Hannah the respondents did
have notice of the general nature of the inquiry. 12' Also the statute creating the Commission provided for certain protections. It
required that a thirty day notice announcing the subject matter of
the hearing be given before the commencement of a hearing. It
also provided for the right of a witness to be accompanied by counsel, who would have the right to subject his client to reasonable
examination. The statute required that where any evidence would
tend to defame, degrade, or incriminate a witness that that evidence
shall be taken in executive session. The Legislature directed the
Commission to
afford any person defamed, degraded, or incriminated by
such evidence or testimony an opportunity to appear and
be heard in executive session, with a reasonable number of
additional witnesses requested by him, before deciding to
use such evidence or testimony.
Finally, if the Commission used or released any evidence in a manner which revealed publicly the identity of the person defamed,
degraded or incriminated such evidence must have first been given
1 22
at a public hearing.
The Jenkins Rule
In 1968 the Supreme Court was again faced with an issue
nearly identical to that in Hannah v. Larche.'23 The Court was
asked to determine whether the procedures of an administrative
Commission violated due process as guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment. The Commission which was challenged in Jenkins
24
was the Louisiana Labor-Management Commission of Inquiry."
The Labor Commission was created by the Louisiana Legislature
119. Id. at 444.
120. Id. at 454.
In the appendix to the opinion the Court describes the Rules of
Procedure governing the authorized investigative procedures of a
representative group of administrative agencies, executive departments, Presidential commissions and Congressional committees.
The appendix is designed to demonstrate that the procedures
adopted by the Civil Rights Commission are similar to those which
have traditionally been used by' investigating agencies in both
executive and legislative branches of government.
121. Id. at 441, n.18.
122. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1975a (a) (b) (c) (e) (1970).
123. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411 (1969).
124. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23:880.1-23 (Supp. 1969).
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in 1967 to investigate and make findings of fact relating to violations or possible violations of the criminal laws of Louisiana or the
United States arising out of or in connection with the field of
labor-management relations.12
The Labor Commission was
formed because the Louisiana legislators found "unprecedented
conditions" within labor-management relations in Louisiana industry and felt that "allegations and accusations of violations of state
and federal criminal laws should be thoroughly investigated in the
public interest."'12 6 The Legislature felt that the additional investigative facilities of the Labor Commission were necessary to
supplement and assist the efforts and activities of the several district attorneys and other law enforcement officials and agencies
127
in Louisiana.
The nine commissioners who serve on the Labor Commission
are appointed by the Governor 2 and they investigate allegations
of violations at public hearings. 29 The Commission was given the
power to subpoena testimony and records, 13 0 although these subpoenas must be enforced in state courts.1 3' In addition, the Labor
Commission is given the power to promulgate appropriate rules
and regulations to carry out its investigative function. 32 The enabling statute specifically limits the Labor Commission's actions to
investigations of violations of criminal laws, the Commission having "no power, authority, or jurisdiction to investigate, hold hearings or seek to ascertain the facts or make reports or recommendations on any of the strictly civil aspects of any labor problem.
The Labor Commission is under a duty to make and publicize
its findings of whether there is probable cause to believe that
criminal laws have been violated;"34 but its power is limited to
making findings and recommendations.
The Commission shall have no authority to and it shall
make no binding adjudication with respect to such violation or violations; however, it may, in its discretion, include
in its findings the conclusions of the Commission as to specific individuals ... [and] [i]f the Commission finds that
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at § 880.1.

Id. at preamble to Acts 1967, 1st Ex. Sess. No. 2.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at

§ 880.6.
§ 880.8.
§ 880.9.
§ 880.8.
§ 880.6.
§ 880.7.

there is probable cause to believe that there has been a violation of any criminal law .. .it shall report its findings
and recommendations to the proper federal and state authorities ... charged with
135 the responsibility for prosecution of criminal offenses.
A witness who has been subpoenaed by the Commission is
given notice of the general subject matter of the investigation prior
to his appearance. 3 6 The witness is permitted the benefit of coun3 7
sel, who may also question his client as to any relevant matters.
The Act provides that when testimony would tend to "defame, degrade, or incriminate" any person that that evidence must be
taken in executive session, 138 and that the person who might be so
degraded, defamed, or incriminated has the absolute right to appear and be heard in executive session and to call a reasonable
number of witnesses in his behalf. 139 The Act further provides
that any evidence upon which the Labor Commission bases its
findings and recommendations must be taken in public session. 40
The appellant in the Jenkins case filed a complaint alleging
that the Labor Commission was unconstitutional because it denied
a person compelled to appear before it the right to effective assistance of counsel, the right to confrontation, and the right to compulsory process for the attendance of witnesses called by one who
is testifying.' 4' The appellant further alleged that:
[s] aid Commission of Inquiry exercises (a) an accusatory
function, (b) its duty is to find that named individuals are
responsible for criminal law violations, (c) it must adverserve as part of the
tise such findings, and (d) its findings
42
process of criminal prosecution.
The Supreme Court granted the appellant standing to sue because the complaint "does allege that the Commission and those
acting in concert with it have taken and will take in the future
certain actions with respect to appellant."'1 43 The Court found that
any injury to the appellant would not be a "collateral consequence"' 44 of the actions of the Labor Commission and that it was
not necessary that the Commission attempt to impose any direct
sanctions on the appellant, stating "it is enough that the Commis45
sion's alleged actions will have substantial impact on him.'
135. Id.
136. Id. at § 880.10.
137. Id.
138. Id. at § 880.12.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).
142. Id. at 422.
143. Id. at 423.
144. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 443 (1960); cf. Sinclair v. United
States, 279 U.S. 263, 295 (1929).
145. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 424 (1969); see, e.g., Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942); cf. NAACP
v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-63 (1958).
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In examining the Labor-Management Relations Commission of
Inquiry and appellant's contention that such Commission acted in
violation of his constitutional rights, the Supreme Court was immediately confronted with the Hannah rule which it had delineated
only nine years earlier. The Court after re-affirming the decision
in Hannah, found that the Labor-Management Commission differed "in substantial respect" from the Civil Rights Commission in
Hannah.146 The Labor-Management Commission, the Court stated,
"does not adjudicate strictly speaking in the sense that a court
does, nor does the Commission conduct, strictly speaking, a criminal proceeding."' 147 The Court held that "[n]evertheless, the Act,
when analyzed in light of the allegations of the complaint, makes
it clear that the Commission exercises a function very much akin
to making an official adjudication of criminal culpability."'148 Noting that the Labor Commission was only concerned with "exposing
violations of criminal laws by specific individuals,' 1 49 the Court
found:
[T]he Commission clearly exercises an accusatory function; it is empowered to be used and allegedly is used to
find named individuals guilty of violating the criminal
laws of Louisiana and the United States and to brand
them as criminals in public.' 50
The Court in Jenkins, after examining the Hannah rule held that
"where the Commission allegedly makes an actual finding that a
specific individual is guilty of a crime, we think that due process
requires the Commission to afford a person being investigated the
right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him.
"'15k

The Jenkins rule clearly stands for the proposition that when
an administrative agency exercises accusatory functions or finds
specific individuals guilty of violations of criminal laws, due process guarantees are mandatory. It is important to note that the
Court found the procedures violative of the due process rights
even though (1) the purpose of the Commission was investigatory
and fact finding; (2) witnesses were given notice of the general subject matter of the investigation before being required to
appear; (3) the statute provided for mandatory executive session
when testimony was potentially damaging; (4) witnesses had an
146.

395 U.S. at 427.

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 428.
Id. at 429.

absolute right to appear and call a reasonable number of witnesses;
and (5) all testimony or evidence upon which findings were based
had to be given in open hearing. The Court based its decision
largely upon the following facts: (1) the Commission makes actual
findings that specific individuals are guilty of violations of criminal
laws, (2) the Commission publicizes those findings, (3) a witness
does not have the rights of confrontation and cross-examinations,
(4) the right of a witness to present evidence is left to the discretion of the agency, (5) the Commission exercises no legislative
sum total of the Commisfunctions, and (6) its finding that the
152
sion's actions are accusatory in nature.
Applicability to the Pennsylvania Crime Commission
The Hannah and Jenkins decisions have determined that the
application of due process to the administrative hearing depends
upon whether the agency exercises investigatory or accusatory
functions. Whether due process guarantees are applicable to the
Pennsylvania Crime Commission must necessarily be made by
comparing the Crime Conunission with the commissions in Hannah
and Jenkins. Whether its broad investigatory' 53 function placed
the procedures of the Crime Commission within the purview of
the Hannah or the Jenkins rule was considered by the commonwealth court in May of 1972.154 In Pennsylvania Crime Commission v. Nacrelli'15 the court considered a proceeding to enforce subpoenas against four individuals. The respondents contended that
the publicity surrounding the subpoenas and the subsequent public hearing would be accusatory and, therefore, that it would be in
violation of their constitutional rights not to afford them the traditional due process protections. 15
The commonwealth court determined that the Crime Commission was neither adjudicatory nor accusatory in function and
found, therefore, that the Hannah rule was controlling. 15 7 Stating
that the purpose of the Crime Commission was to investigate and
to gather information concerning improper criminal activities, the
court found that the Commission's duty is to submit reports of
recommendation relating to future legislation. In applying the
Hannah rule the court distinguished the Jenkins case on two
grounds. 15 8 First, the Labor-Relations Commission in Jenkins was
empowered to gather and present criminal findings of fact, accusatory in nature. Second, the commission in Jenkins had no specific
152. Id.
153. See notes 11 through 15 and accompanying text supra.
154. Pennsylvania Crime Comm'n v. Nacrelli, 5 Pa. Commonwealth Ct.
551 (1972).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 559.
157. Id. at 573.
158. Id. at 571.

Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

mandate which required it to report to the Legislature in furtherance of its legislative function.
It would appear, however, that the Nacrelli decision is subject
to question when viewed in the light of additional facts and considerations. The commonwealth court based its findings solely
upon its interpretation of the statute. 15 9 The Supreme Court in
deciding Jenkins, however, made its determination upon a consideration of the broad overview of the Commission's activities including its enabling statute, the Commission's practices and results,
and the allegations in the complaint.6 0 The difference between
the two courts' approaches is paramount. It must be remembered
that the Court in Jenkins found the Labor Relations Commission
to be exercising an accusatory function in that it was empowered
to and allegedly did make actual findings that specific individuals
were guilty of violations of criminal laws. The Jenkins rule requires that in such a case, due process is mandatory.
It is submitted that the Pennsylvania Crime Commission exercises an accusatory function identical with that of the commission condemned in Jenkins, but that the commonwealth court
failed to consider that fact. It is true that the Crime Commission
exercises a duty to investigate and gather information concerning
improper criminal activities, and that it has a duty to submit recommendatory reports. But the Crime Commission also does "support and assist state and local law enforcers with its investigative
and legal staff, accounting expertise, and intelligence sources' 161
and work within the Department of Justice blending its "considerable investigatory and hearing powers [with the] Attorney General's prosecutorial authority."' 8 2 And further the Crime Commission does make specific findings that named individuals have violated criminal laws. It was this last action specifically which was
the basis for the Jenkins rule.
The Crime Commission has issued at least five separate reports wherein it publicizes the fact that it has made findings that
specific individuals have violated criminal laws. 163 The Delaware
159. Id.
160. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411 (1969).
161. Pa. Crime Comm'n, Report on Organized Crime at 3 (1970).
162. Id. at 81.
163. Pa. Crime Comm'n, Report on Organized Crime (1970); Interim
Report on the Conditions of Organized Gambling and Administration
of Criminal Justice in Johnstown, Pa. (1971); Criminal Infiltration of Legitimate Business in the PhiladelphiaArea, Preliminary Report (1971); Interim
Report of the Investigation in Delaware County, Pa., with ParticularReference to Abuses in Bail-bonding (1971); Interim Report concerning the

County Report'0 4 is typical of such Crime Commission reports
and will be examined here because it was the investigation from
which the Nacrelli case grew. In the Delaware County Report,
an investigation of abuses in bailbonding, the Crime Commission
promises that "[t]he leaders and protectors of racketeering and
corruption will be identified wherever found."' 65 The Commission
states that the report shows "the truth about such charges of systematic and organized corruption,"16 6 and promises in the coming
months to "get to the bottom of the existence of organized gambling and corruption.' 167 For some twenty-six pages the Crime
Commission relates portions of the testimony it received from over
one hundred and twenty confidential interviews and thirty-five
witnesses testifying at public and private hearings. 68 The testimony charges violations of criminal laws and implicates at least
six police captains, four professional bondsmen, and fifteen District
Justices and Magistrates. The Commission itself cites, "__'s
heavy handed solicitation of kickbacks,"'' 60 and "The 'commission'
to which ----------------------- (district justice) referred [to as having received] constituted an illegal payment from a bondsman for his
personal benefit."'170 Under the heading "Findings" the report
states the following: "a number of Chester bondsmen have systematically entered into illegal arrangements with local police officers and district justices, and which involve a systematic payment
of kickbacks;'17 1 "Chester bondsman
- has been writing bonds
since 1968 without a professional bondsman's license-a practice
which constitutes a clear violation of state laws;' 7 2 - - -s
partner,
, has sought the added advantages of writing both
as a licensed professional bondsman and as an agent of a surety
company, a practice that is illegal under the Professional Bondsman's Act;' 7 "Additionally, and
have both submitted false statements to the Pennsylvania Insurance Department."'1 74 The Crime Commission in the Delaware County Report
recommended that the "Judicial Inquiry and Review Board
promptly commence proceedings to remove from office those district
justices implicated in the solicitation and receipt of kickbacks. InPreliminary Investigation into Allegations of Corruption within the Philadelphia Police Dept. (1972).
164. Pa. Crime Comm'n, Interim Report of the Investigation in Delaware County, Pa., with Particular Reference to Abuses in Bail-bonding
(1971).
165. Id. at 4.
166. Id. at 1.
167. Id. at 3.
168. Id. at 8-34.
169. Id. at 27.
170. Id. at 29.
171. Id. at 36.
172. Id. at 37.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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formation relative to charges against these district justices will be
made available to the Board by the Crime Commission."'1 7 5 And
under the heading, "Commission Exhibit C-i," which is entitled,
"Kickbacks to District Justice -,
paid by Chester bondsman
-- " the report reproduces three cancelled checks drawn on
the account of the bondsman made payable to the order of the dis176
trict justice.
It is submitted that this report and others, issued by the Crime
Commission, evidence the exact type of activity and findings which
the United States Supreme Court condemned in the Jenkins decision. An examination of the reports show that the Pennsylvania
Crime Commission has in the past made and continues to make actual findings that specific individuals have violated criminal laws.
177
Further, in submitting these findings to prosecuting authorities
the Crime Commission has itself become an integral part of the
system of criminal prosecution. Justice Frankfurter, concurring
in Hannah v. Larche cautioned:
Were the Commission exercising an accusatory function, were its duty to find named individuals responsible
for wrongful deprivation of voting rights and to advertise
such findings or to serve as part of the process of criminal
prosecution, the rigorous protections relevant to criminal
prosecutions might well be the controlling starting point
for assessing the178protection which the Commission's procedure provides.
The fact that the Crime Commission makes and publicizes such
findings was not considered by the court in Nacrelli. Whether an
oversight or purposeful omission because the case concerned only
the possibility of such a finding is unclear, 79 but it is submitted
that cognizance of such practices may call for a different conclusion. Further, the distinction that the Labor Commission in Jenkins had the duty to find named individuals guilty of violating
criminal laws and that the Crime Commission has and utilizes the
power to do the same thing appears to be a distinction without a
difference, since the same result obtains in each case. In each case
the commissions found specific individuals guilty of violating criminal laws. Viewed from the perspective of those individuals, the
175.

Id. at 38-39.

176. Id. at 46.
177. Id. at 35.
178. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 488 (1960).
179. Compare Pennsylvania Crime Comm'n v. Nacrelli, 5 Commonwealth Ct. 551, 569 (1972) with Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 424-25
(1969).

fact that the Crime Commission acted from discretion rather than
duty would offer little solace.
It would seem further that the court in Nacrelli failed to consider another factor-the undeniable trend which criminal law has
taken since the Hannah decision. This movement in the law since
1960 has been toward the placing of greater safeguards around a
defendant's rights and the placing of further restrictions upon
governmental agencies and officers. 180 The Nacrelli approach and
interpretation is seemingly anachronistic to the trend of these Supreme Court opinions.
Rights of Witnesses and Investigatees
The Pennsylvania law presently leaves the witness or investigatee of the Crime Commission in a precarious position. His rights
are largely determined by the Commission itself. He may or may
not have notice of the subject matter of the investigation. His
hearing may be open or closed as the chairman may determine.
He may or may not be permitted to introduce evidence on his own
behalf, and evidence taken from other witnesses will be governed
by no rules of evidence. He will not have the right of confrontation or cross-examination, and any statement he wishes to enter
in closing may or may not be permitted.18 1
The witness or investigatee does have two recognized rights.
He may object to any question as being impertinent; 18 2 yet the
Commission itself makes the determination of whether or not the
question is pertinent to the investigation.1 83 If the witness refuses
to answer, the Commission can seek a court order requiring him to
answer.18 4 The witness also has the right to the fifth amendment
180. For evidence of a trend, see, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961) (holding inadmissible in state criminal proceedings evidence obtained by illegal searches and seizures); Gibson v. Florida State Investigating Committee, 372 U.S. 539 (1963) (an investigating committee was
required to show a proper nexus between its investigation and the organization under investigation in order to subpoena that organization's
membership list); Molloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (the fourteenth
amendment made mandatory in state courts the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964);
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (statements of defendant while
in police custody held inadmissible because no warning of the right to
remain silent, to have counsel, and that the statement would be used
against him in court); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (that the
attaching of electronic listening and recording devices to a phone booth
within the purview of the fourth amendment); Spinelli v. United States,
393 U.S. 410 (1969) (conviction reversed for want of probable cause to issue search warrant); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search
held unreasonable as beyond the area to which defendant had immediate
access at time of arrest).
181. See Rules of the Crime Comm'n, 1 Pa. Bull. 2231 (1971).
182. Id. at § 2.8(c).
183. Id.
184. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 307-7(9) (Supp. 1972). See also, In re
The Petitions of the Pa. Crime Comm'n, 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 650 (1971);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 211.502 (a) (2) (Supp. 1972).
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privilege against self-incrimination, yet even this right has been
partially eroded.' 8 5 Indeed the rules of the Crime Commission
"are instructive reading for a draftsman who might desire to provide the semblance while avoiding the reality of any restraint
upon the activities of an administrative body."'18
IV.

CONCLUSION

The problem of organized crime is one which is real and immediate in our society. The networks and syndication of organized
crime have grown to an extent that conventional state law enforcement agencies find themselves ill equipped to meet the challenge with which they are confronted. In order for the challenge
of organized crime to be met the law enforcement groups require
the assistance of an agency that can maintain a constant and ongoing investigation of criminal activity.
Through the Pennsylvania Crime Commission, however, the
Pennsylvania Legislature while attempting to find a panacea has
created an instrumentality whose potential for abuse and unbridled heroism is unlimited. The Crime Commission can investigate
what it wants, when it wants. It can require any citizen to answer questions or charges of unknown origin in secret chambers
or under the awesome gaze of the television camera. The Crime
Commission itself decides what rights the witness or investigatee
shall have, and the allocation of those rights has been parsimonious.
The real fear engendered by the Crime Commission, however,
lies not in this threat to what were hitherto thought of as inalienable rights of every citizen; but rather in the realization that the
Crime Commission is accountable to no one, and that those who
would maintain a check upon this power refuse to do so. Indeed as
it is the Executive who determines the members of the Crime Commission and thereby to an extent its policy; and as the Legislature
has placed no safeguards upon the power issued to the Crime
Commission; and as the judiciary refuses to apply any; the Crime
Commission has within itself become the grand jury, the prosecutor, the judge and the jury. Although it is true that the Crime
Commission cannot decree that an individual be incarcerated, it is
untenable to conclude that where the Crime Commission publicizes the fact that it has found that a particular individual has
violated a criminal law that that action is not accusatory.
185. See K. Davis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT, § 3.03 (3d ed. 1972).
186. Pennsylvania Crime Comm'n v. Nacrelli, 5 Pa. Commonwealth Ct.
551, 593 (1972) (dissenting opinion).

I believe that it is the duty of this Court to control the
investigatory conduct of overzealous or irresponsible or
politically activated fact-finders so that individual's fundamental rights are not swept aside. Too high a price can be
paid for the results to be obtained in the administration of
legislatively mandated investigative proceedings. In an attempt to attain the statutorily prescribed goals, those
charged with this public function must be constantly vigilant to remember that the safeguards which have been
erected to insure against untrammeled abuses must not be
forgotten
in their desire to serve the total public inter18 7
est.
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187. Pennsylvania Crime Conm'n v, Nacrelli, 5 Pa. Commonwealth Ct.
551, 583-84 (1972) (dissenting opinion).

